ABSTRACT Motivational interviewing (MI) is an American behavioral health intervention that has spread dramatically across professional fields, including counseling psychology, corrections, dentistry, nursing, nutrition, primary-care medicine, safe-water interventions, and social work. This article explores how the central methodological principles of American pragmatism—if understood and learned as MI—take root among a group of contemporary American helping professionals. More specifically, the article shows how professional training in MI inculcates: (1) a steadfast focus on the immediate consequences of one’s acts rather than floating or abstract conceptions of the true, the good, or the right; and (2) an investment in a highly reflexive mode of knowledge acquisition, which relinquishes the certainty of positivist explanations and embraces doubt. Indeed, learning how not to know is part and parcel of becoming an American pragmatist, and this article details the labor, costs, and rewards of adopting a pragmatic, or (in)expert, sensibility.

RESUMEN Realizar una entrevista motivacional (MI) es una intervención de salud conductual estadounidense que se ha extendido dramaticamente a través de los campos profesionales, incluyendo psicología de consejería, servicios correccionales, odontología, enfermería, nutrición, medicina de atención primaria, intervenciones para agua segura y trabajo social. Este artículo explora cómo los principios metodológicos centrales del pragmatismo estadounidense—si entendidos y aprendidos como MI—se arraigan entre un grupo de profesionales estadounidenses contemporáneos que proveen ayuda. Más específicamente, el artículo muestra cómo el entrenamiento profesional en MI inculca: (1) un enfoque continuo en las consecuencias inmediatas de los actos de uno en lugar de concepciones flotantes o abstractas de lo verdadero, lo bueno o lo correcto; y 2) una inversión en un modo altamente reflexivo de adquisición de conocimiento, el cual renuncia a la certidumbre de las explicaciones positivistas y acoge la duda. En realidad, aprender cómo no saber es parte integral de llegar a ser un pragmatista estadounidense, y este artículo detalla la labor, los costos y las recompensas de adoptar una sensibilidad pragmática o (in)experta.

For anthropologists interested in expertise, professional training is an especially ripe subject of study. Most apparently, training is a transactional event wherein trainers impart specific principles, methods, skills, ways of seeing, and/or sensibilities to apprentices, some of whom go on to train others. Professional training is therefore also a scalar endeavor (Carr and Lempert 2016), whether the most pressing goal is to produce more practitioners, more sophisticated practice, better or broader implementation, increased professional stature, and/or wider public recognition. As if that were not interesting enough, training also is often a ritual that processes people from one socially salient category to another, tethering them to technical, ethical, and even spiritual ways of knowing along the way.
Professional training’s tendency to host explicit discourse about the distinguishing features of a particular form of knowledge only adds to its ethnographic allure. When we observe professionals in action, we are left to deduce much of what is often plainly articulated in training—that is, theoretical foundations, epistemic bases, genealogies, operational instructions, practical challenges, and/or anticipated outcomes. Furthermore, in the dense life of training, as apprentices and trainers interact with manuals, instruments, PowerPoint slides, examinations, and proxies of all sorts, we find apprehension, doubt, and critical questioning alongside rationalizations and carefully construed definitions of what makes some form of knowledge useful and unique. At the same time, thanks to their bountiful self-descriptions, trainings invite observing anthropologists to connect what is professionally defined and bounded as expertise with the broader cultural principles from which trainers more implicitly draw and to which they, in turn, contribute.

While central to the authorization and institutionalization of knowledge, training alone does not produce expertise. Expertise, by definition, requires ongoing enactment (Carr 2010). Indeed, well after their formal training, would-be experts are constantly interacting with objects of knowledge and projecting their ways of seeing and knowing those objects as expert. In this sense, expertise is an exemplar of what Michael Silverstein (1992, 2003) calls “second order indexicality”—that is, metadiscursive practices (e.g., rationalizations, evaluations, diagnoses) that mediate between and confer value to would-be experts and some set of cultural goods (Carr 2010). However, if expertise is inherently processual and intensively interactional, it is often only recognized to the extent that knowledge can be naturalized as a stable attribute of the expert.

In this light, what shall we make of a professional training regimen that cultivates inexpertise, encouraging apprentices to embrace uncertainty and carry forth that uncertainty over the course of their professional careers? Why would anyone train to be inexpert, especially when it turns out to be such hard work? What are the advantages, especially in professional realms, of trading certain knowledge for lack thereof?

To answer these questions, this article focuses on the professional training of motivational interviewing (MI)—a behavioral health intervention in which a growing number of North American professionals, across a wide variety of fields, have been trained. MI was introduced in the early 1980s by American clinical psychologist Dr. William R. Miller as an innovative way to engage problem drinkers. While central to the authorization and institutionalization of knowledge, training alone does not produce expertise. Expertise, by definition, requires ongoing enactment (Carr 2010). Indeed, well after their formal training, would-be experts are constantly interacting with objects of knowledge and projecting their ways of seeing and knowing those objects as expert. In this sense, expertise is an exemplar of what Michael Silverstein (1992, 2003) calls “second order indexicality”—that is, metadiscursive practices (e.g., rationalizations, evaluations, diagnoses) that mediate between and confer value to would-be experts and some set of cultural goods (Carr 2010). However, if expertise is inherently processual and intensively interactional, it is often only recognized to the extent that knowledge can be naturalized as a stable attribute of the expert.

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To answer these questions, this article focuses on the professional training of motivational interviewing (MI)—a behavioral health intervention in which a growing number of North American professionals, across a wide variety of fields, have been trained. MI was introduced in the early 1980s by American clinical psychologist Dr. William R. Miller as an innovative way to engage problem drinkers. Since that time—thanks in large part to scores of MI-specific books, several thousand research articles focused on the method, and a virtual army of devoted trainers—MI has spread across professional fields, including counseling psychology, corrections, dentistry, nursing, nutrition, primary care medicine, safe-water interventions, and social work.

Across these varied professional domains, MI is trained and practiced as a “conservational style” devoted to addressing the common problem of ambivalence about change (Miller and Rollnick 2013, 29, 410). MI trainers promise their growing and increasingly diverse professional audience an intricate set of rhetorical techniques as well as a special way of “being with people,” which insiders call “MI spirit.” What is more, trainers of the method vow that when “MI skills” and “MI spirit” are properly combined in the motivational interview, ambivalent clients will “talk themselves into change” (159).

Ambivalence—or “simultaneously wanting and not wanting something, or wanting of two incompatible things”—is the motivational interview’s immediate target as well as its very condition of possibility. As MI’s foundational textbook puts it: “Ambivalence is not really an obstacle to change. Rather, it is ambivalence that makes change possible” (Miller and Rollnick 2002, 23). Positing that all people grapple with opposing wants, wishes, reasons, and needs (12), even those who appear to be most stalwart in their behavior, MI proponents contend that their method can help people resolve ambivalence regardless of whether it involves drinking alcohol moderately or in excess, practicing poor oral hygiene or brushing and flossing, boiling or not boiling river water, or taking prescribed medications or failing to do so.

As a “conversation style,” MI trains professional attention on the dynamics of dyadic communication (i.e., “interviewing”) regardless of the qualities of the person or problem at hand. Accordingly, ambivalence is approached as an interactional rather than a psychic conundrum, with the interview devoted to verbally airing competing goals and social expectations about some problematized behavior. Given that the goal of the motivational interview is to work through—or talk through—these conflicts so that there is resolution in favor of normatively acceptable behavioral change, ambivalence is not as much a foundational concept as it is MI’s central operational principle. More broadly, MI is strikingly devoid of theoretical propositions about human psychology, circumventing assumptions about personhood or pathology that could inhibit its uptake among professionals and institutions of particular disciplinary or doctrinal persuasions.

While this elasticity has clear strategic benefits, facilitating MI’s spread and uptake, it is also philosophically grounded. In training professionals to embrace doubt, forestall definitive conclusions, and welcome surprise, MI inculcates the principles of practice once elaborated by early American pragmatists like John Dewey, William James, and Charles Sanders Peirce. And while MI does so with no explicit reference to this philosophical tradition, I nevertheless argue here that to be trained in MI is to be trained in American Pragmatism and that learning how not to know is an indispensable part of becoming an American pragmatist.

As we will see, the pragmatism that infuses MI training requires apprentices to rethink the relationship between knowledge and practice, adopt an experimental mindset,
and resist extra-contextual, generalist conclusions. Accordingly, MI apprentices are expected to jettison diagnostic logics that typologize clients and their problems and prescribe courses of treatment accordingly. Even ambivalence is concertedly pragmatized in practice. Rather than theorizing ambivalence as an ontological state, inherent to the client, it is instead approached as a supposition or a mid-level hypothesis that allows the professional to proceed in an interaction. Indeed, knowing the nature, source, or content of the ambivalence at hand is not just irrelevant but is also potentially dangerous, short-circuiting the process of learning.

What matters in MI is the process by which the interviewer works with ambivalence, understood as a hypothesis, searching for verbal evidence in an interviewee’s ongoing turns at talk so as to determine what to do and say next. In other words, rather than applying general theory or “evidence-based” knowledge from one case or client to another, apprentices to MI learn to approach each interview as a new discursive field in which to learn and work. As I’ll argue below, this is a form of practical reasoning as much as a style of learning that Peirce (1974) called abduction, which depends heavily on the supposition of not knowing.

To elaborate these points, I draw on extensive ethnographic fieldwork on MI training, including fourteen consecutive months as a participant observer of an advanced MI training at a large urban social service agency that I call U-Haven. I observed fourteen additional MI trainings, which ranged in institutional and geographic location, in length from several hours to several days, and in number and professional background of participants. In addition, I collected and analyzed the copious textual material MI trainings generate, including trainers’ PowerPoint presentations, exercise descriptions, poster paper on which breakout groups track their progress, binders full of MI literature collated by trainers and distributed to apprentices, and training evaluations. I also archived professional newsletters, trainer websites, and training demonstration films and tracked the ever-growing clinical research literature on MI. Last, but not least, I conducted dozens of recorded interviews with participants in MI training, from newcomers to the method’s most prominent trainers and proponents, including a series of interviews with MI’s founder and lead developer, William Miller.

Taking the U-Haven training as its central ethnographic ground, this article explores how the central methodological principles of American Pragmatism—if understood and learned as MI—take root among a group of contemporary American helping professionals. More specifically, I will show how MI training inculcates: (1) a steadfast focus on the immediate consequences of one’s acts rather than floating or abstract conceptions of the true, the good, or the right, and (2) an investment in a highly reflexive mode of knowledge acquisition, which relinquishes the certainty of positivist explanations and embraces doubt. By way of these pragmatic principles—which proponents of MI take to be simultaneously ethical and technical—MI offers an alternative to both a deductive logic, which finds the roots of problems and (therefore) cues for solutions in the interiors of suffering people, and the focus on measurable “clinical outcomes,” so firmly embedded in the contemporary culture of social and health service provision.

As we will see, training in MI—and by extension, American Pragmatism—succeeds to the extent that it cultivates an irreverence to stabilized and disciplined forms of knowledge, if risking the stabilized and disciplined professional identity entailed therein. To be sure, there are costs of trading definitive knowledge for doubt, particularly for professionals—like nurses and social workers—who are not widely recognized as experts from the start. With this in mind, and in conclusion, I highlight what the case of MI—and its pragmatic embrace of inexpertise—reveals about the dynamics of American expertise, including public ambivalence about expert authority and precarities of contemporary American professional labor.

ROLE-PLAY AND REFLEXABILITY (OR, LEARNING WHAT TO SAY NEXT)

On the morning of the first day of Ki’s advanced training at U-Haven, twelve urbanite apprentices entered and circled the four-hundred-square-foot training room. Cheerful if clipped greetings provided the soundtrack for what looked like an awkward, slow-motion square dance. Apprentices’ eyes darted nervously between fellow participants and the folding chairs tucked under the joined tables, as if one seat might offer more comfort, or perhaps a better view, than the next. The two video cameras that I had placed in the room’s corners, with the help of a technically savvy research assistant, surely heightened the sense of an encompassing audience ready to evaluate apprentices’ performance. That said, participant observation is part and parcel of every MI training, whether or not an anthropologist, her assistants, and equipment are involved. In vivid and often amusing terms, veteran MI practitioners recount the discomforts of having their rehearsals of MI continuously examined by colleagues, trainers, and coaches, while appreciating that ongoing evaluation is critical to the cultivation of their method.

U-Haven is one of the largest social service organizations in a major American city and is strikingly diverse in the services it offers (i.e., residential care, drop-in programs, counseling services, medication management, refugee resettlement, outreach services, needle exchange, and medical care and referrals). Accordingly, its staff is professionally diverse, ranging from psychiatrists, nurses, and social workers—many with master’s degrees in social work from elite institutions but some with bachelor’s degrees in social work or equivalent bachelor’s degrees—to paraprofessional staff who were once clients of U-Haven’s services. Some U-Haven staff administer complex programs, writing grants and hiring staff to keep them afloat, and others provide direct services, such as counseling or case management. Yet, despite this professional diversity, which was reflected in the
training room, U-Haven staff uniformly experience work conditions that are dreary and draining. They are charged with treating highly complex and pressing problems, and the resources with which to do so are rarely at hand.

Ki—a white, forty-something clinical supervisor at U-Haven as well as a seasoned trainer—was intimately familiar with the challenges of apprentices’ work, having run weekly supervision meetings wherein staff regularly recounted faltering or failed strategies of engagement and a concomitant sense of inefficacy and burnout. Deeply committed to the principles of harm reduction, U-Haven prides itself on serving clients other city programs reject because of the complexity of their problems. In contrast to contingency-based programs, which require drug users to abstain from drugs and attend drug treatment while receiving case management, shelter, or ancillary services, harm-reduction programs like U-Haven focus on providing such resources to all participants in need of them, regardless of whether or not they abstain from drugs. Practically, this means that U-Haven professionals regularly interact with participants who are high, inebriated, in withdrawal, or otherwise suffering effects of drug and alcohol use. It also means that, relative to professionals in more traditional service settings, they have comparatively little leverage in getting clients to address what they view as the behavioral correlates of their circumstances. Ki designed the advanced training with these professional challenges in mind and with faith that MI can work in most any setting.

It was no accident that Ki picked exactly twelve apprentices from the pool of applicants to his training. That number allowed him to evenly break the group into duos, triads, and foursomes for various exercises that allowed apprentices to practice the techniques he taught during the didactic portion of monthly sessions. As a member of the Motivational Interviewing Network of Trainers (or “MINTie”), Ki had access to and had himself practiced scores of MI-specific exercises, including “Out of the Woods,” “Dr. Clark’s Referral,” “Drumming for Change Talk,” and “Calling the CATS.” Many of these exercises, as incoming apprentices had anxiously anticipated, involved closely evaluated, highly improvisational public performance.

Indeed, much like improv actors, apprentices had to be on the ready.6 Sometimes, in the course of a PowerPoint presentation, Ki would suddenly turn to an unsuspecting apprentice and animate a random statement that a U-Haven client might make (i.e., “I blew my check. I need an advance”; “I can’t stand these meds anymore”; “It took me forever to get here”). Betraying varying levels of discomfort and apprehension, the targeted apprentice would then verbally venture an MI-consistent response. Ki inevitably followed these surprise improvisational encounters with thanks and praise, finding the “gems” in apprentices’ frequently fumbling responses.

Role-playing is an indispensable part of MI training, and not because it allows apprentices to put theory into practice. Practice is undertaken for practice’s sake, with the idea that one will continuously learn from each role one takes up in every role-play. Role-plays are therefore concertedly pragmatic exercises, training apprentices to be rigorously attentive to the effects of their own actions, to avoid preemptive conclusions about the nature of the problem and person immediately before them, and to appreciate that what works in one conversation may not work in the next. In the pragmatic mode, one learns by (role-)playing, and (role-)playing is learning (Dewey 1913).7 Through role-plays, apprentices come to appreciate that there are no stock responses or scripts for motivational interviews, in large part because there is no operating theory of personhood or pathology that might serve as a basis.

Since—in line with the pragmatism of MI—the content of what to say therefore cannot (and should not) be determined in advance, role-plays provide opportunities to experiment with MI-specific methods of managing unpredictable conversations to come. Just as importantly, however, role-plays are opportunities for professionals to analyze themselves, and particularly their own ways of speaking, rehearsing the various roles they may come to play in the mercurial, real-life drama of behavior change.

For these reasons, advanced MI training sessions, including those at U-Haven, typically devote substantial time to role-plays. Usually, U-Haven apprentices rehearsed motivational interviews in triads: one playing the part of the practitioner, another the role of a problem-plagued client, and the third in the role of observer. During these exercises, Ki circulated among role-playing groups, squatting so as to listen (as much as to watch), nodding ever so slightly and sometimes emphatically as the interview progressed, exchanging pregnant glances with the assigned observers, working to discern if they heard the nuances of the role-play as he did (see Figure 1).

Early in MI training, role-play exercises typically focus on the four primary speech acts or “strategies” comprising the motivational interview—Open Questions, Affirmations, Reflections, and Summaries—better known by the acronym OARS (see Table 1). As Ki explained to his apprentices, “Everything and anything that we do … relies very heavily on the OARS.” This is not only because the elicitation and resolution of ambivalence is dependent on the successful deployment of these speech acts;8 also, and more immediately, OARS help practice and project uncertainty so as to sustain the interview as inquiry, as we will see below.

Although the apprentices were familiar with OARS as counseling skills that—even as MI’s lead proponents recognize—are not unique to MI, and already used them in their daily work with clients, they invariably found the MI-specific performance of these speech acts deceptively difficult to pull off during training. Indeed, once the person playing the client broached a topic he or she wished to address, those practicing the role of interviewer came to appreciate that there is no rhetorical formula that can be
adopted across interviews, but only more or less strategic improvisations using OARS.

If MI training is very similar to improv training, it does not necessarily attract those with a penchant for dramatic performance. Apprentices squirmed when their affirmations sounded canned; they winced after asking a closed question (which invited unproductive yes or no responses) when they realized they could have asked open ones (that induced more talk from clients); they sighed, shorted, and threw up their hands to hide their faces when they found themselves lost about what to summarize at the end of a role-played session, as if their mouths had failed them as much as their memories. And while Ki was always nearby chiming in with encouragement over the course of the role-play itself—“beautiful,” “that’s right,” “exactly”—apprentices learned to listen for cues from those with whom they role-played, no matter how discomfiting that continued to be.

The feedback sessions following role-plays are at least as important in MI training as the performances themselves. After all, role-plays are fractal recursions of the performer/audience participation framework that characterizes MI training and allows performing apprentices to get direct feedback from those cast as observers (see Irvine and Gal 2000). Assigned observers typically use worksheets to assure they are assessing the right things. They sometimes report their findings on an “OARS Tracking Sheet,” which requires them to tally how many times the role-playing interviewer uses one of the four rhetorical strategies (see Figure 2). The worksheet also asks for a count of “other” (i.e., MI-inconsistent) conversational strategies that are used, such as asking “closed questions,” “providing opinions or advice,” “teaching”—all glosses for projecting authoritative expertise. In this sense, the post-role-play evaluation session is not just an opportunity for the interviewer, who receives

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**FIGURE 1.** Role-playing exercises at U-Haven. (Courtesy of author) [This figure appears in color in the online issue]

**TABLE 1.** Four primary speech acts or “strategies” comprising the motivational interview

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>“Four Strategies”</th>
<th>As defined in the glossary of <em>Motivational Interviewing</em> (Miller and Rollnick 2013)</th>
<th>As explicated in the course of Ki’s training</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Open Question</td>
<td>“A question that offers the client broad latitude and choice for how to respond”</td>
<td>Cannot be answered with a “yes” or “no” or with one or two words Nonrhetorical; seeks information from the client in an ostensibly neutral way Encourages the client to talk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affirmation</td>
<td>“An interviewer’s statement valuing a positive client attribute of behavior”</td>
<td>Supports clients’ sense of efficacy, strength, and power Acknowledges challenges and difficulties Validates feelings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reflections</td>
<td>“An interviewer statement intended to mirror meaning (explicit or implicit) of preceding client speech”</td>
<td>Rephrasing what you think you heard Making a guess at what the client means; a hypothesis Adjusting hypotheses about client behavior at various levels of complexity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summaries</td>
<td>“A reflection that draws together content from two or more prior client statements”</td>
<td>Strategically “distilling” what the client has said and offering it back to clients</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
structured feedback about OARS counts and qualitative comments on how well they produced and responded to change talk; evaluations are also a chance for the observer to objectify the role they would soon inhabit and to imagine how they might strategically manage the improvised expressions of the role-played client. Trainers therefore insist on frequently switching roles so as to give all apprentices the opportunity to hear and evaluate their own performance, as heard in the dramatized present as well as the projected, actual future.

Over the course of these ongoing exercises, apprentices develop increasing reflexivity about their own speech. Take one apprentice, a middle-aged Black program manager named Marcus, who had just received what he thought was a soft-pedaled evaluation from an OARS-counting colleague. In debriefing the role-play with Ki, with the other eleven apprentices listening in, the hard-working apprentice ruefully recounted:

The other thing is, is… I think two of us struggled with this: the opinion and advice piece. Uh, I ended up towards the end giving my opinion and advice, and I knew I was doin’ it, but I couldn’t stop myself from doin’ it. But once I realized I was doin’ it, I did turn it around at the end, but I, I just could not stop. I, I had to tell him what I thought my opinion, my advice was, but I couldn’t stop, even if I knew it. Even I knew it. I, I saw myself… doin’ it; I still did it.

While Marcus was troubled by his MI-inconsistent speech acts, Ki took the otherwise problematic “giving of opinion and advice” as a victory, precisely because Marcus had heard himself doing it, which he readily pointed out to his fretting
apprentice. Trained as analysts of themselves as speakers, MI apprentices are not only expected to track, in real time, precisely what they are saying and doing when they engage in a motivational interview. They are also trained to adjust their speech in studied relation to how each client (real or role-played) responds in the here-and-now of the interview.

Indeed, the primary purpose of role-plays is to make apprentices more reflexive about the immediate effects as well as the constituents of their speech. Not surprisingly, then, as the U-Haven training continued, apprentices provided increasingly incisive and sometimes scathing commentary about their own performance, much like Marcus did. In the meantime, their trainer assuaged their guilt and explained that there was really no rhetorical mistake from which one could not recover. As Ki put it when responding to Marcus’ comment during the training:

If that’s [i.e., giving opinions and advice, in MI inconsistent ways] something that … you feel pretty tuned into, you’re good. Right? I think ideally, what we’re doing is we’re tracking it, though. Ok? So I’m starting to feel the inclination to give some advice … or to render an opinion. Or to provide some information. And to give yourself a pause. “Is that what’s really needed here?”

Note that Ki again praises Marcus precisely because he is “tuned into” his mistakes, which is suggestive of a mode of knowledge, a kind of presentist orientation that is typically associated with the mode of knowledge known as reflexivity.

Yet, in the pragmatist vein of MI training, reflexivity is not about knowing who one is but rather about watching what one is doing and saying; as such, it is also a way of learning that is particularly sensitized to the temporal vagaries of social and discursive interaction. Accordingly, Ki asked Marcus and his colleagues to discern their own conversational “inclination(s)” before they act. The trainer soon added that there are “no hard-and-fast rules in MI,” only (rhetorical) techniques designed to cope with the vagaries of loaded “conversations.” Significantly, Ki wrapped up his response to the fretting apprentice by urging him to pause, reminding him that he can slow down the interview to ask himself anticipatory questions, like whether giving advice is “really what is needed here.”

As Ki’s comments indicate, MI training cultivates a kind of reflexivity that is better described as reflexability, in which one collects and considers evidence from an immediate past in the present to chart a knowable, if yet unknown, future. In this sense, reflexibility is not simply a matter of being present to one’s actions; it also demands anticipation of what one will be doing and saying relative to the emerging demands of unfolding encounters with clients. Significantly, then, reflexability is not a stable state of self-knowledge that one can simply inhabit. As Ki clarifies, the goal is not to become the kind of person or professional who never gives advice because of some ideological principle or identitarian stance. Rather, reflexability is a highly adaptive know-how that is designed to cope with and adjust to the unfolding of social life, and particularly verbal interaction, the trajectory of which can never be fully knowable in advance.

RESISTING ENDS: TRAINING IN VERNACULAR PRAGMATISM

On the day of U-Haven’s final training session, apprentices’ faces were noticeably long despite the first rays of spring filtering through the large soot-caked windows of their training room. Ki’s characteristic beam was also dimmed as he assumed his usual spot at the head of the room, hands folded solemnly, almost as if in prayer. With typical morning banter now but a murmur, the bus traffic at the busy intersection five floors down seemed all the louder. Those gathered stared at the wall clock as it crept toward the 9:00 a.m. starting time or studied Ki’s furrowed brow as he gathered himself to begin his training’s end.

Ki’s plan for the session was to solidify a central MI skill, called “rolling with resistance.” To “roll with resistance”—in technical terms—means to offer verbal supports rather than counters to what clients say, regardless of the interviewer’s evaluation of or investment in that statement. For instance, if an interviewee with a few months of hard-won sobriety says, “At this point, I think I can manage having a drink now and then,” the interviewer “rolls with resistance” when responding with a statement like, “It’s not like before. You can handle alcohol now.” In MI, this is otherwise known as an “amplified reflection.” The idea is that in the absence of a verbal challenge and presence of verbal affirmation, interviewees will readjust and perhaps reconsider what they’ve just said. But rolling with resistance is risky work and technically difficult to pull off. After all, the client could simply take the interviewer at her word. Yet the rewards, as Ki and other MI proponents emphasize, are ample. As a (false) hypothesis, the amplified reflection invites clients’ verbal corrections, both increasing the likelihood that clients would “talk themselves into [positive] change” (Miller and Rollnick 2013, 159), while providing more fodder for professionals to continue to learn and act in the meantime.

Before diving into the substantive lesson of the day, Ki would learn that his disciples were intent on a dirge. Perhaps it should have come as no surprise that, on this particular day, the apprentices’ attention was trained on death. There was, most immediately, the impending loss of their beloved trainer to mourn. After all, Ki’s relationship with most of the trainees extended well beyond the training room, whether he served as their actual supervisor, a less formal mentor, or—as in most cases—a professional model to admire, even adore, from a relative distance. One of the pleasures of the training, several apprentices told me, was to watch and listen to the inspirational Ki in action: role-playing an MI-infused interaction with a recognizably difficult client, underscoring the ethics of their work at U-Haven in moving and eloquent terms, and nodding in deeply knowing sympathy as they reported everyday professional struggles. Although they did not betray their admiration for their trainer in their paper applications for the MI training, citing instead the desire to
“better engage participants” or “hone clinical skills,” several apprentices told me that Ki was their primary reason for wanting to join the training. Charisma-notoriously, even definitionally-eludes description, and before the training, the chosen participants struggled to articulate just what about Ki was so attractive. For instance, in an interview conducted before the initial training session, Marcus commented, “You’re probably familiar with Ki? Ki is someone that, I mean, I really admire this guy, and he … he’s like someone that I would love to be like my mentor ‘cause he … he just has so much … t-t-I just … w-wanna know him … more so.” Months into the training, the apprentices became markedly more fluent in their explanations about why their trainer was so engaging; they had come to understand Ki as an embodiment of the “spirit” of MI, whose way with words allowed him to exude a special presence (see Carr, n.d., chapter 4). In this sense, the loss of their mentor, not just in body but as embodied spirit, was reason enough to mourn on that day.

There was also the rush of actual deaths of program clients, which began in January and built, in tragic crescendo, over the spring. Apprentices and their colleagues found it increasingly difficult to make sense of it all as they discovered the bodies of longtime clients, dead from overdoses and untreated illnesses. For some, the rush of deaths was like a radical test case for the harm-reduction modality to which U-Haven was committed. As mentioned above, while U-Haven offers an impressive variety of treatment options for active drug users, professionals have little leverage in populating these services, one of the reasons they wanted to “better engage participants [clients]” through further training in MI. Client deaths, a few dared to quietly worry, indicated that U-Haven professionals had not only failed to reduce harm but had also perhaps facilitated it.

Notwithstanding these simmering concerns, it came as a shock when, during that mournful last gathering with Ki, one of the apprentices implied that the confluence of the trainees’ increasing use of MI and the recent deaths of participants was no mere coincidence. Among training participants, news had quickly spread that one of those who had died had recorded an MI practice session with Derrek—a young white case manager, who was widely liked and respected by professionals and clients alike—just days before. What was more, the recorded session had focused precisely on the drug habit that was suspected of killing the well-known client. So, as Ki began his final training as planned, focusing on how to operationalize the concept of “rolling with resistance,” Marcus abruptly interrupted him by wondering aloud whether the communication method Ki had been teaching them may—in fact—be fatal.

Ki: I do want to leave us with some ideas about resistance in addition to those we’re now discussing. To really play the tape out.

M: Roll with it. I just want to say something, [Ki].

Ki: Speaking of resistance. [room laughs]

M: There have been … several deaths of participants that I’ve had where they contacted me. And I have practiced motivational in-
terviewing in, uh, these interactions with these participants and they died.

Ki: Yes.

M: And it’s like … When do we leave it alone? When do you … look at what you’re doing wrong? Is there … and I know I’m not God, but … I do believe in those interactions there are some points where it could make a difference. But the resistance is always there, I mean …

Ki: “The resistance is always there.” What do you mean?

M: And just rolling with it? The nonjudgmental approach. And, you know, it’s [trailing off].


This was likely not the first time Ki had been accused of teaching a method that leads to, if not directly causes, people’s death, and does so precisely because it “rolls with” rather than confronts participants’ putative “resistance.” Several other MI trainers I worked with shared anecdotes of deeply troubled and sometimes hostile trainees, usually at introductory staff trainings, who would raise angry hands, write scathing post-training emails, or even use training breaks to personally relay, in no mincing terms, that MI could kill people by not offering direct and forceful verbal counters to participants’ self-destructive behaviors and their resistance to change. And, while Ki stumbled a bit in response, resorting to a common MI refrain (“simple, not easy”), he soon regained his composure, offering up a bouquet of pragmatic principles, as filtered through MI, to deal with the death thrust before him.

Significantly, Ki did not hesitate to acknowledge the dead body brought to life in the training room, as well as the resulting horror of U-Haven professionals. Yet he also seized upon the opportunity to connect ontological matters (i.e., the death) to methodological questions (the professional interactions that may or may not have contributed to it), with a clear emphasis on the latter. His challenge was to accept that MI, like any professional intervention, was likely somehow implicated in the death while inspiring continued faith in the method. Ki also was intent on practicing the MI-specific skill on the agenda for that day. Accordingly, Ki remarked, "So [Derrek] did a recording. His recording with someone. And one of the behaviors that they were looking at was one of the behaviors that was probably a contributing factor to this gentleman’s death. And so you’re right, [Marcus]." In so saying, Ki managed both to model the skill he wanted to impart to Marcus and his fellow apprentices and use it on them as if they were clients. After all, by providing an “amplified reflection” of what Marcus had just said, that is, repeating it in somewhat exaggerated terms, Ki demonstrated how to “roll with resistance,” even though the resistance was brewing among professionals rather than their clients, in this instance.

In affirming and asking Marcus to clarify his statement that “resistance is always there,” Ki focused on another critical disjuncture between what he had been teaching and Marcus’s last-ditch challenge. In the pragmatism of MI, the salient question is not whether some quality, like resistance
or ambivalence, already exists. Rather, inquiry is focused on the proximate conditions that could interactionally heighten, lessen, or even manufacture it. Accordingly, Ki not only relocated the deadly entity in question—resistance—from inside the participant to inside the professionally led conversation. He also explained that resistance is not a stabilized essence but is rather a variable product of interaction:

If the therapist genuinely has no investment in the outcome, then resistance does not exist. [In MI], the paradox is ... the more we impinge, the more we intrude, people are even less likely to pursue ... change. And that the less ... we intrude and are intrusive, the more likely, the more free people are, the more free people are to explore and examine and pursue change, the more likely they are to do so.

Given the references to individual freedom, Ki’s explanation may first appear to be an expression of an ethical commitment to (neo)liberal self-determination. After all, he seems to suggest that people will naturally pursue change if unfettered by external expectations and directives. Yet to read Ki’s statement this way would be to obscure its emphasis on a pragmatic method, which trains apprentices’ focus on the processes rather than the “outcomes” of their work. After all, the “freedom” to which Ki refers is the freedom afforded by the skillful, process-focused therapeutic dialogue—the idea that participants will verbally “explore and examine and pursue change” if the conditions to do so are provided within the properly crafted interview. At the same time, MI-trained practitioners use those verbal explorations as evidential fodder—as cues about what to say and do next. This rigorous, reflexive attention to the process of interaction is both central to American Pragmatism and at the very heart of MI training.

INSTRUCTION IN ABDUCTION: REHABITUATING PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE

In Ki’s above comments, readers will discern—as apprentices did—that therapeutic goals are hardly abandoned in MI. As Ki conceded throughout the training, “therapeutic neutrality is a myth.” Nevertheless, Ki and other MI trainers offer little positive theory in such refusals’ stead. Rather, MI trainers ask apprentices to abandon generic theses about who people are and why they suffer so as to decipher the specific demands of presenting interactions and improvise accordingly. They do so by re-gearing professional attention from how and why things are or should be (for clients) toward how to effectively act (as professionals) based upon what has been learned by way of immediate interactions.

In line with their frequent reminders that “clients are the best teachers,” MI trainers focus apprentices’ attention on the immediate effects of their words on the here-and-now of the dyadic exchange. Through role-plays, as we learned above, apprentices learn to carefully calibrate not just what they say but also how and when they say it, in accordance with the speech of the individual who sits before them. In this sense, MI training is as much about studying the effects of one’s speech as it is about learning particular strategies of speaking. More specifically, over the course of their training, MI apprentices begin to realize that knowledge gained through practice is radically unstable, always dependent on what happens next, which frequently exceeds expectation and offers surprises. They also learn to constantly adjust, refine, or revise what is known in reference to what is learned through their interviews. MI training, therefore, is instruction in abduction—that mode of practical reasoning and reasoning practice most closely associated with the father of American Pragmatism, Charles Sanders Peirce.

Formally speaking, abduction is inference built from an observed body of data to working hypothesis, which provides guidelines for further action and investigation (see also Carr 2015; Carr and Fisher 2016; cf. Helmreich 2007, 2009). In practice, abduction requires the inquiring subject to engage in an ongoing process of organizing what one has learned into a provisional guess or supposition that, in turn, organizes how to take the next step of meaningful action. In this sense, abduction is a habit of thought that concertedly resists the seduction of definitive solutions to finite problems. Abduction necessitates holding meaning in suspense. As Dewey (1997, 108) put it, “We stop and think, we de-fer conclusion in order to in-fer more thoroughly. In this process of being only conditionally accepted, accepted only for examination, meanings become ideas.” Rather than holding firm to meaning, we “tentatively entertain” and evaluate it “with reference to its fitness to decide a perplexing situation” (emphasis in original).

In the context of the motivational interview, then, abduction means treating clients’ statements not as referential signs of who they are, what they feel, or how they suffer (see Carr 2011). Rather, clients’ words are “ideas” (in Dewey’s sense) that signal how the interview—as a kind of investigation—is going, and how to practically proceed.

Ki also made clear that definitive truth is not the goal of the successful reflection. Rather, much in line with Dewey’s suggested habit of thought, the client response to the interviewer’s reflection serves as a provisional clue for the professional about what to say and do next. Recall, for instance, Ki instructing his apprentices: “So as, as long as the reflection, right or wrong, leads us further down the path, then that’s okay. Sometimes getting it wrong gives us as much information as it does to get it right.”

Consider, too, the common MI role-playing exercise called “Out of the Woods,” which begins with the preface, “Everyone makes mistakes and when you do, it is quickly apparent in your client’s response.” Assigned observers then monitor role-played MI sessions, drawing connections between every defensive, resistant, or disinterested client-actor response to specific statements made by the acting interviewer, with critical observations shared aloud at the end of the exercise. Eventually, it is expected that trainees will eventually learn to get “out of the woods” on their own, analyzing and readjusting the interviews they conduct in real time. This near-constant, highly analytical reflection on and attendant retooling of what ones says and does in relation to the mercurial conditions of particular verbal exchanges is
the key to the method, for in MI, as in American Pragmatism, “To act intelligently and to see intelligently become at bottom one” (Peirce 1974, 652).

That MI is a method of sensitizing one to the unpredictable conditions of practice, rather than a theory of practice or a recipe for action, was sometimes uncomfortable for U-Haven trainees. Understandably, they sometimes yearned for general propositions that could guide their practice, or decision trees that could naturalize and depersonalize their courses of action. Not infrequently, apprentices expressed radical doubt that even the most poetic, most attuned, and most technically sophisticated motivational interview could make a difference in the intractable problems they faced in their daily work.

However, significantly, Ki’s training stimulated rather than quelled their doubt that the problems they face could be fully understood and definitively resolved by way of any method. Indeed, when U-Haven apprentices played out the frustrations of seemingly irresolute clients with apparently intractable problems, Ki—like many pragmatists before him—worked intently to reorient apprentices’ attention from the nature of the person or problem at hand to the ethical and practical question of what to do next (see Dewey 1972, 67). And so, even on that mournful morning of the training, when Ki was confronted with Marcus’s radical questioning of MI, his goal was not to squelch that doubt but rather to motivate it and render it productive—to direct it. Thus, when another apprentice—who had earned a master’s degree in social theory before becoming a case manager at U-Haven—responded to Ki’s above comment on the dynamics of resistance by saying, “it’s almost like a Western arrogance … that the individual is actually in control,” the trainer delicately redirected that comment from theory to method:

I think Western arrogance is … is an appropriate way in which to think about it sometimes. And I think in terms of our work with [clients], I think we sometimes we really need to play the tape out [emphasis added]. I think we get these ideas in our head that there are things that we’re not doing or that we could do to somehow … have more control or manipulate the outcome. I have … often walked out of those situations feeling what could I have done differently? Should I have pushed harder? Should I have … is there something wrong with my practice that it wasn’t working or it didn’t work as well? Where does my responsibility begin and end? Those are all really good and important questions. At the same time, I am also of the opinion that we do the best we can. And we continue to learn and we continue to practice and we continue to offer anything and everything that we can to the people with whom we work [Ki’s emphasis].

“Play the tape out” is a common American treatment expression, one with which many in the room that day were likely familiar. Encapsulated in the phrase is the idea that those prone to behavioral problems should think ahead about how one (negative) action could lead to another. In Alcoholics Anonymous, for instance, the expression serves as a mnemonic device, reminding the sober alcoholic to anticipate the likely series of events that would unfold if s/he were to make the decision to have a drink, like a kind of negative forecasting. In MI, as we have seen, the interviewer strives to create the dialogic conditions for the client to verbalize such forecasts aloud so that they might talk themselves out of the verbalized behavior before engaging in it.

However, and quite significantly, when Ki speaks of “playing the tape out,” he is urging professionals to engage in this forecasting. Ki thereby reveals that to abduct requires the professional to proceed attentively and with readiness to adjust to what one learns along the way, without relying on teleology or assuming trajectories based on what happened in the past. In essence, he tries to shorten the time horizon of the professional’s reflexive inquiries. In this vein, MI trainers commonly urge apprentices to “slow down” (or, in Dewey’s terms, “de-fer”) so as to pay attention to the immediate effects of their practices. For instance, Ki once instructed, “I do think there’s value in slowing down sometimes. And so that we can pay attention and really … and also sometimes it’s being comfortable and sometimes it’s being comfortable with being uncomfortable.”

The idea of slowing down may seem ironic given that at U-Haven, as in many sites where MI is practiced, interactions with clients are far more likely to be time-pressured exchanges in a crowded corridor than in a cushy-chairred office with a timer set to fifty minutes. Yet, as Ki makes clear, the rapid pace of what actually happens is no excuse to be seduced by the expediency of certainty, which only truncates the abductive process. “Slow down,” then, is a mode of attention that allows trained practitioners to both “pay attention” to the verbal data of the interview and make use of it even in the most time-constrained circumstances. Ki, like the other MI trainers I studied, beseeches their apprentices, if not in these words, to “consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we perceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object” (Peirce 1974, 258). This is the pragmatic maxim.

The term “maxim” is often interpreted as a principle or rule that lacks flexibility. The pragmatic maxim, however, is a principle of conduct that sensitizes those who follow it to a world of possibilities in which their own actions are always necessarily implicated. In other words, a pragmatic habit of mind anchors interpretive possibilities to the situation at hand, if only long enough to chart the next course of action. It was with these highly reflexive demands of the pragmatic maxim in mind that I hoped to further understand when asking Ki to clarify what he meant by “playing the tape out” long after that last training session. In an emailed response, he distilled what I later came to understand as the deep pragmatism of MI.

Too often we think of these aphorisms—and the suggestions/advice contained therein—as applying only to the people with whom we work. They can also be useful for practitioners, if not in our personal lives perhaps in our professional lives. When faced with a possible course of action or a decision-making point over
Here, Ki clarifies how implicated MI professionals are—and should recognize themselves to be—in the habitual work of producing knowledge for practice. Furthermore, by this explanation, reflexivity is far more than the general reversal of the clinical lens to focus on “practitioners” rather than “the people with whom [they] work.” In quintessentially pragmatic terms, reflexivity also entails relentlessly tracking how one’s premises play out in practice, and how one’s own actions help change conditions that were previously known, shaping further inquiry and action accordingly. Figuring out what to do, then, means pausing, reflecting, and then letting the “tape play out.”

Needless to say, to engage in this sort of abductive process is to implicitly embrace the idea that knowledge acquisition is never passive or impartial. Along these lines, Ki’s reference to MI as “experimentation” is particularly compelling. He frames proper practice as the manipulation of reality, which harnesses doubt and moves carefully toward more assured belief, which itself survives only as long as it takes to make the next decision. In the meantime, he dismisses the idea that certain means will naturally lead to expected outcomes as “fantastic.” For Ki, as for all American pragmatists, observation is always necessarily also about ongoing decision and is therefore always an active process.

Furthermore, note that in Ki’s explanation, as in Peirce’s, possible courses of action are also constantly evaluated for their effects, both in the short term and in the long term. Like his fellow MI trainers, Ki’s guiding principle—or maxim—is to never determine the end in advance but rather to arrive at the next “incomplete” or “problematic” situation in which something must be done (Dewey 1922, 161, 177–78). Arguably, this is both a way of tightening the connection of means and ends and of suggesting that there are no final answers in inquiry, no solutions that would absolve one from further action. Since the first problems of practice persists, Ki encouraged his apprentices to keep experimenting and analyzing, whether uningested medications, ignored treatment plans, shared needles, unpaid rents, or ever-present bedbugs were at hand (see Carr 2015).

From this perspective, there is nothing fatalistic about applying the same ideas to the deaths of clients, for as Ki said on that last day of training, “people are going to die no matter what we do.” Rather than simply condemning what all in the room already think to be wrong (death by drugs), Ki tried to clinch what he’d been working at all along: an ethical recalibration by way of MI. More specifically, he reorients the harrowing dilemma away from the acting subject (i.e., the professional who prevents an individual’s death by an act of intervention) to the abductive subject (i.e., the practitioner who prevents harm in the long run if not in each and every case by way of continual reflection and direction). He thereby works to instill in his crestfallen apprentices that knowledge and practice, if properly and rigorously habituated, would live on in the service of others.

There are costs to as well as rewards from adopting the pragmatic mode of engagement that Ki and other MI trainers impart. But they also render a vital message in clear and moving terms: there are no ends to apprentices’ work, philosophically, practically, or ethically. For even in the face of physical and material ends—whether the death of clients or the evaporation of service funding—those faithful to their pragmatic training persistently situate themselves in the midst of their practice as inexpert and as apprentices—that is, as those always poised to learn in an unfolding world in which they are intrinsically part, rather than know in a stabilized world that offers an objective remove to claim certain, enduring knowledge (cf. Lave and Wenger 1991). Following Ki’s directive to “continue to learn, continue to practice,” which echoes Dewey’s (1922, 281) counsel that “education is not a means to living, but is identical with the operation of living a life,” U-Haven apprentices remained focused on what just happened to the immediately pressing question of what to do next (see Carr 2015).

CONCLUSION: THE PRAGMATICS OF AMERICAN INEXPERTISE

Not all American professionals are considered experts, just as not all American workers are considered professionals. Though many employed by U-Haven have postgraduate education from elite institutions and extensive training and experience in the field, they are not regularly recognized as experts. As some have argued, American social workers populate a field so variegated and are faced with a charge so diffuse that professional boundaries, and therefore status, are difficult to delimit (Abbott 1995). And as I have argued extensively elsewhere (see Carr, n.d.), the very complexity of the problems with which American social workers are commonly charged hinders them from benefitting from the second-order projections that, say, neuroscientists and sommeliers do. A long history of efforts to scientize social service and behavioral health professions, including the most recent focus on “evidence-based practice,” are indicative of these challenges.

To be sure, the stakes of not knowing—or adopting a pragmatic sensibility—are unevenly distributed among American professionals. Yet while this risk of “not knowing” may have put U-Haven social workers at further disadvantage when consulting with program psychiatrists, for instance, the vast majority of Ki’s training participants felt relieved and intellectually rewarded by the pragmatic recalibration of their professional sensibilities. What is more, as they left the training and put the pragmatic maxim to work in their interactions with clients, they found strategic benefits as well. Projecting (in)expertise, or a lack of knowledge, by
open questions or inaccurate reflections yielded more data in the way of client verbalizations, and therefore more evidence to undertake their work. And in this, MI is hardly alone. Consider Bergmann’s (1992) study of psychiatric intake interviews, in which professionals frame their own knowledge as uncertain and in need of confirmation so as to elicit more information from clients. Like the case of MI, this not only suggests that American knowledge acquisition depends on not knowing, as some scholars who have studied professional scientists have established, but also that enactments of expertise may rely upon successful projections—and carefully choreographed performances—of (in)expertise far more often than we realize.

Finally, while an anthropology of expertise must always attend to who can afford to (not) know what, and when, we must also factor in the long-standing public ambivalence about expert knowledge (Cohen-Cole 2014), which, among other things, interferes with cultural ideals of autonomous, self-knowing, and self-directed subjects. In an era in which expertise is under especially fierce attack in the United States, we may find that the enactment of expertise increasingly relies on the enactment of inexpertise, and that professional training more centrally involves learning how not to know. If this turns out to be so, MI is an exemplar, and early American Pragmatism paved the way.

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NOTES

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2. As anthropologists have keenly demonstrated, not all modes of apprenticeship are dependent on the spoken word (see especially Briggs 1986; Lave 2011).

3. Although—in both the MI literature and in training—ambivalence is often naturalized as part of human experience and sometimes moralized as wanting to “do the right thing” relative to nonnormative behaviors, it is most often (loosely) conceptualized as an interactional impasse in which two people’s goals conflict. However, here as elsewhere, MI’s definitions of key constructs are highly pragmatic, inviting a range of interpretive possibilities—from psychodynamic understandings of ambivalence to behaviorist ones.

4. “Helping professional” is a term of art, which rather euphemistically refers to those—like social workers, counseling psychologists, nurses, teachers, and dieticians—whose jobs are devoted, by definition, to caring for or “helping” others. However, helping professionals are especially prone to feel overwhelmed by their work, given that their work involves “control” as much as “care,” that they are commonly charged with complex problems that defy ready and clear solutions, and that they typically lack resources—from their own time to concrete services—relative to client demand for them. Like many of other contemporary professionals, the conditions of their labor are precarious and uncertainty abounds in their work (see Carr, forthcoming; cf. Graeber 2018).

5. Notably, MI’s demographics are as stratified as they are diverse. Consider that the vast majority of MI’s leading proponents are white and highly educated professionals; they are also mostly men with a few prominent exceptions. While over three-quarters of North American MI trainers are also white professionals, a slight majority of whom are women, the helping professionals that they train are far more diverse in terms of race, class, and educational attainment than they are, with an overrepresentation of women and people of color as compared to the adult US population. Furthermore, the client base with whom these helping professionals typically work are significantly less economically advantaged, less educated, and far more likely to be nonwhite. This pattern holds at U-Haven, though nine of the twelve trainees were men. Elsewhere (Carr, n.d.) I discuss how MI proponents and trainers deal with these loaded differences in practice—from MI’s pragmatic refusal to diagnose and differentiate people and problems to their claims that MI is (therefore) widely, if not universally, applicable.

6. Keith Sawyer’s ethnography of improv theater in Chicago is relevant here, not only given his general attention to the semiotics of improvised action, but his description of “offers,” which requires a reflexive attention to other actors as well as an overall attention to the emergent frame of the event (see, in particular, Sawyer 2002, 74, 124).

7. Dewey distinguished play (from work) by the absence of a goal exterior the activity itself. In MI training, MI role-plays are not only the central way apprentices learn the method and its inherent techniques, but also continually refine those techniques, with no promise of mastery ever offered.

8. Again, because MI sees ambivalence as a condition of possibility rather than an ontological state, elicitation is as much about the interactional production of ambivalence than the revelation of ambivalence from the client.

9. Of course, there is an enormous literature on reflexive social action, which ranges from semiotic approaches to phenomenological ones. Here, I focus on a particular practice of reflexivity, which is ever attuned to unfolding interaction, pragmatism, and the paradox of inexpertise.
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